GASPRO International Journal of Eminent Scholars

ABSTRACT
The extent to which electoral provisions are incorporated into the constitution is significantly affected by the level of public trust in the country’s election administration. In many established democracies with a high level of public trust in lawmaking and public administration in general, and the organization of elections in particular, constitutions do not make provision for the design of the EMB. A more usual practice is for an EMB, particularly an independent EMB, to be empowered to make reviewable regulations by filling in the detail of concepts contained in the law, or filling existing gaps in the law. For governmental EMBs, this power may be held by the ministry within which the EMB is located. Such regulations in most countries are subject to review, generally by a court or constitutional court, to test whether they are within the powers of the EMB (or ministry) to make, and whether they are otherwise consistent with the law. Many EMBs have the power to formulate administrative policies and directions on operational issues such as their relationships with their own staff (on matters such as gender equality, affirmative action, performance management and staff development) and with external stakeholders. External stakeholders include government ministries, in particular finance ministries, the legislature, political parties, CSOs and the media.
KEYWORDS: Legal Framework, Legal Instruments, Powers and Electoral Processes